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INTRODUCTION 
Minimum wage laws in the United States had a rocky start at the 
beginning of the twentieth century.
1
 States were the first to enact these 
laws, which were met with a series of constitutional challenges under the 
Fifth Amendment.
2
 Initially, the U.S. Supreme Court consistently struck 
down minimum wage laws as impinging on freedom of contract.
3
 It 
wasn’t until 1937 that the Court reversed these rulings, determining that 
freedom of contract was not in fact protected by the Constitution.
4
 The 
next year, Congress adopted a national minimum wage standard by pass-
ing the Fair Labor Standards Act.
5
 Ever since, all fifty states have been 
bound to enforce, at a minimum, the federal minimum wage standard.
6
 
As of early 2015, the federal minimum wage was $7.25 per hour,
7
 
but twenty-nine states, and Washington D.C., have enacted statutes set-
ting the minimum wage higher than this required minimum standard.
8
 
Washington State’s minimum wage of $9.47 per hour is currently the 
highest of any state in the nation.
9
 Current trends show cities enacting 
                                                        
 1. See Clifford F. Thies, The First Minimum Wage Laws, 10 CATO J. 715 (1991). The first hint 
of a minimum wage law was in Massachusetts in 1912 but was virtually unenforced. As other states 
adopted laws, they too had weak or nonexistent enforcement measures or were struck down by the 
U.S. Supreme Court as well as states’ own supreme courts. Id. at 716–19. 
 2. Id. at 716–17. 
 3. E.g., Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525, 545 (1923). The Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment was said to protect freedom of contract, which included the freedom to 
negotiate wages. Id. 
 4. Thies, supra note 1, at 720; see also West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) 
(ruling that a Washington State minimum wage law was constitutional in a 5–4 decision). 
 5. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012); Thies, supra note 1, at 720. 
 6. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012). 
 7. Minimum Wage Laws in the States – January 1, 2015, U.S. DEP’T LAB. WAGE & HOUR 
DIVISION, http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/america.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2015). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. But Washington D.C. has a higher minimum wage of $9.50 per hour. Id. 
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local ordinances establishing a city-wide minimum wage.
10
 The Seattle 
City Council, by a unanimous vote in June 2014, enacted an ordinance 
implementing a plan to gradually increase the city minimum wage to $15 
per hour,
11
 an increase of over 60%.
12
 The Minimum Wage Ordinance 
(Seattle Ordinance) went into effect April 1, 2015.
13
 Almost as soon as 
the legislation was passed, there was backlash
14
 from a group of local 
independent businesses and the International Franchise Association 




This Note will discuss the implications of a high minimum wage by 
examining the debate around the Seattle Ordinance with a particular fo-
cus on the IFA lawsuit. To analyze the possible impacts of the Seattle 
Ordinance, current and historical arguments both in support of and in 
opposition to minimum wage laws are considered. This Note ultimately 
concludes that the U.S. District Court rightly denied the IFA’s motion for 
a preliminary injunction, which would have frustrated Seattle’s experi-
ment before it began.
16
 Seattle’s plan to implement a $15 minimum wage, 
and similar experiments, should be permitted to proceed because the 
problem of income inequality is sufficiently troubling, and attempts to 
find a solution must be afforded some latitude. 
This Note also acknowledges, however, that there are dangers to 
raising the minimum wage. Opponents of the minimum wage increase 
                                                        
 10. See City Minimum Wage Laws: Recent Trends and Economic Evidence, NAT’L EMP’T LAW 
PROJECT, http://www.nelp.org/publication/city-minimum-wage-laws-recent-trends-and-economic-
evidence-on-local-minimum-wages/ (last updated Sept. 18, 2015) [hereinafter City Minimum Wage 
Laws]. Several other cities are planning to raise their local minimum wages above those of their 
states. San Francisco, for example, passed an ordinance in 2014 to raise the minimum wage to $15 
an hour by 2018. Id. 
 11. Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 124490 (June 2, 2014) [hereinafter Ordinance 124490], availa-
ble at http://www.seattle.gov/council/issues/minimumwage/attachments/Ord_124490.pdf (codified 
at SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 14.19 (2014)). 
 12. Hector Barreto, The Real Reason for the Seattle Minimum Wage Fight, FORBES (July 24, 
2014, 1:44 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/07/24/the-real-reason-for-the-seattle-
minimum-wage-fight. 
 13. See SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 14.19.030(A) (2014). 
 14. While supporters of the Seattle Ordinance celebrated the City Council’s vote, the response 
of Steve Caldeira was “Game on.” John Bacon, Seattle Raises Minimum Wage to $15 an Hour, USA 
TODAY (June 3, 2014, 3:23 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/06/02/ 
seattle-minimum-wage-vote/9863061/ (showing Caldeira and his colleagues in menacing business 
suits, contrasting with the bright orange of the minimum wage supporters). See FORWARD SEATTLE, 
http://forwardseattle.wordpress.com (last visited Apr. 15, 2015). 
 15. Matt Driscoll, Challengers Line Up to Thwart Seattle Minimum-Wage Bill, Including Tim 
Eyman, SEATTLE WEEKLY (June 5, 2014, 3:23 PM), http://www.seattleweekly.com/home/952983-
129/challengers-line-up-to-thwart-seattle. 
 16. Int’l Franchise Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 97 F. Supp. 3d 1256, 1263 (2015). 
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suggest that possible consequences include job loss and failed business-
es.
17
 Thus, Part I of this Note provides an overview of the historic con-
troversy over minimum wage laws, taking into consideration concerns 
about employment, economic impact, and social justice. 
Part II explains the new Seattle Ordinance and discusses some of 
the arguments specific to this Ordinance and the IFA lawsuit. Part III 
discusses the franchise structure. Part IV analyzes the predictions of the 
minimum wage hike effects and critiques the arguments of those who 
oppose both the Seattle Ordinance and the raising of the minimum wage 
in general. The Note concludes, reasserting a recommendation that, be-
cause the problem of income inequality requires urgent attention, efforts 
to address the issue must be treated with greater deference while the de-
bate continues. 
I. DEBATING THE HARMS OF A MINIMUM WAGE 
Although the Supreme Court has concluded that the government 
has the power to regulate wages,
18
 the debate among economists over the 
merits of a minimum wage rages on.
19
 This debate has manifested in the 
arguments surrounding the Seattle Ordinance.
20
 Much of the debate fo-
cuses on the effect that a minimum wage has on job loss.
21
 Other relevant 
considerations include the right to a living wage,
22
 the effect on the 
economy at large,
23
 and the burdens placed on public assistance pro-
grams.
24
 There are a number of factors and impacts to consider, but a 
recent study reported that three out of four economists agree that the 
benefits of raising the minimum wage outweigh any drawbacks.
25
 
                                                        
 17. See, e.g., Debra Burke et al., Minimum Wage and Unemployment Rates: A Study of Contig-
uous Counties, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 661, 672–76 (2011). 
 18. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398–99 (1937). 
 19. E.g., Burke et al., supra note 17, at 670–76 (providing an overview of arguments on both 
sides of the debate). 
 20. See, e.g., Bacon, supra note 14; Barreto, supra note 12. 
 21. Barreto, supra note 12. 
 22. See infra Part I.C. 
 23. See sources cited infra notes 78–82 and accompanying text. 
 24. See sources cited infra notes 83–90 and accompanying text. 
 25. Minimum Wage, IGM CHICAGO BOOTH (Feb. 26, 2013, 10:56 AM), http://www.igm 
chicago.org/igm-economic-experts-panel/poll-results?SurveyID=SV_br0IEq5a9E77NMV; see also 
The Job Loss Myth, RAISE THE MINIMUM WAGE, http://www.raisetheminimumwage.com/pages/job-
loss (last visited Oct. 4, 2015). 
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A. The Effect on Employment is Not Compelling Evidence in the Debate 
The supposed adverse effect on employment is one of the key criti-
cisms of minimum wage laws.
26
 Nevertheless, in light of substantial evi-
dence to the contrary, courts should not give much weight to the argu-
ment that the adverse impact on employment should obstruct implemen-
tation of legislation seeking to raise the minimum wage. 
Somewhat ironically, given that effects on employment are fre-
quently raised in objections to minimum wage laws, wage regulation in 
the United States finds its origins in strategies aiming to reduce unem-
ployment.
27
 The original movement to increase the minimum wage de-
veloped in response to unemployment during the Great Depression.
28
 In 
an effort to improve employment, President Franklin D. Roosevelt pro-
posed the “President’s Reemployment Agreement” (Agreement) as part 
of the 1933 National Industrial Recovery Act (Act), which was ultimate-
ly struck down by the Supreme Court.
29
 The Agreement operated as an 
opt-in program where businesses would cut workweeks, hire more work-
ers to make up the lost hours, and increase the hourly wages so that 
workers would earn the same weekly income for fewer hours worked.
30
 
In advocating for this program, Roosevelt reasoned that no business 
would suffer a competitive disadvantage because all employers would be 
making this accommodation.
31
 Employers who voluntarily participated in 
the program were granted the right to display a Blue Eagle for customers 
and the world to see.
32
 Although the Act was eventually determined to be 
                                                        
 26. See The Gist: Does the Minimum Wage Create or Kill Jobs?, SLATE (June 19, 2014, 5:22 
PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/podcasts/gist/2014/06/the_gist_on_raising_the_minimum_wage_and_
gop_chances_of_winning_the_senate.html [hereinafter The Gist]. 
 27. Planet Money: The Birth of the Minimum Wage, NAT’L PUB. RADIO 4:40 (Jan. 17, 2014), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2014/01/17/263487421/episode-510-the-birth-of-the-minimum-
wage. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 13:03. The Supreme Court declared the National Industrial Recovery Act to be un-
constitutional in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), commonly 
referred to as the “sick chickens” case. The Court found that the Act did not bear a sufficiently direct 
relationship to “interstate commerce,” and exceeded the scope of Congress’s power. Id. at 544–50. 
Further, the Court found that the Act unconstitutionally delegated legislative powers to the executive 
branch. Id. at 530–37. “We are of the opinion that the attempt through the provisions of the code to 
fix the hours and wages of employees of defendants in their intrastate business was not a valid exer-
cise of federal power.” Id. at 550. 
 30. Planet Money: Birth of the Minimum Wage, supra note 26, at 4:40. 
 31. Id. at 6:40. Compare Roosevelt’s logic to one of the arguments made by the IFA that fran-
chisees will suffer from competitive disadvantage due to the separate schedules. Complaint at 13, 
Int’l Franchise Ass’n. v. City of Seattle, 97 F. Supp. 3d 1256 (2015) [hereinafter IFA Complaint]. 
 32. Planet Money: Birth of the Minimum Wage, supra note 26, at 7:15. 
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unconstitutional, the Blue Eagle Program illustrates the historic link be-
tween unemployment and a minimum wage.   
Whether a mandatory minimum wage actually harms or impacts 
jobs at all has been the subject of heated debate over the years.
33
 Essen-
tially, there are two schools of thought on the subject: one school con-
tends that a minimum wage exacerbates unemployment, while the other 
argues that a minimum wage has no effect on employment, or even im-
proves employment rates.
34
 The first school of thought, which is based 
on neoclassical economic theory, reasons that a minimum wage negative-
ly impacts employment because setting the price of labor creates a mar-
ket distortion.
35
 Economic theory dictates that, as a result of the price of 
labor being set higher than its value, employers will be unwilling to pay 
for the “commodity” of some workers’ labor, resulting in fewer people 
being employed.
36
 In the context of the Seattle Ordinance, this means 
that, according to economic theory, many people whose work hour is 




As proponents of the second, more recent, school of thought ob-
serve, the problem with relying purely on economic theory is that human 
labor cannot be classified merely as a commodity but is something rather 
unique in the market
38
 because it can be viewed as simultaneously be-
longing to the employer and the employee. While the employer is buying 
                                                        
 33 . Planet Money: Money, Work and TV, NAT’L PUB. RADIO 14:10 (Mar. 28, 2014), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2014/03/27/295341895/episode-528-money-work-and-tv. 
 34. The Gist, supra note 26 at 11:30. 
 35. Id. 
 36 . But see INEQUALITY FOR ALL 23:45 (The Weinstein Company 2013) [hereinafter 
INEQUALITY FOR ALL] (pointing out that the government sets all sorts of rules and regulations in 
order to create a free market, minimum wage included). Reich points out that in the last thirty years, 
the rules have started to change to benefit. Id. 
 37. See Thomas Sowell, Minimum-Wage Madness, NAT’L REV. (Sept. 17, 2013, 12:04 AM), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/358640/minimum-wage-madness-thomas-sowell (explaining 
how minimum wage causes young people and minorities to be priced out of jobs). 
 38. See, e.g., Bruce E. Kaufman, The Theoretical Foundation of Industrial Relations and Its 
Implications for Labor Economics and Human Resource Management, 64 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 
74 (2010) (comparing neoclassical labor economics and human resource management). “The ma-
chine which yields its services to man is itself a commodity, and is only a means to an end, while the 
laborer who parts with labor is no longer a commodity in civilized lands, but is an end in himself, for 
man is the beginning and termination of all economic life.” Id. at 79 (quoting RICHARD ELY, THE 
LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 99 (1886)); see also Edwin E. Witte, The Doctrine That Labor is a 
Commodity, 69 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 133, 135 (1917) (explaining that the property 
rights and the right to do business are not absolute rights and an employer has no right to an employ-
ee’s labor, even if it should do harm to the business). “Though an employer [as a result of an em-
ployee quitting their employment] suffers loss of profits, he has no legal ground for complaint.” Id. 
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the employee’s time and energy, the employee retains the right to quit at 
any time, withdrawing his or her labor from the employer’s ownership.
39
 
This alternate view of human labor makes it less surprising that, in 
contrast to the theoretical analysis, economic data tends to show that 
minimum wage does not have a substantial adverse effect on employ-
ment.
40
 It has only been within the last fifteen years that studies have 
even bothered asking whether the minimum wage has an adverse effect 
on employment.
41
 These studies have produced evidence that a minimum 
wage does not harm employment.
42
 In light of this new evidence, some 
economists are changing their position.
43
 Ultimately, there are studies 
that can support both camps,
44
 but the weight of the evidence shows little 
to no negative impact of “modest increases in the minimum wage.”
45
 
Moreover, meta-studies (studies of studies) corroborate this conclusion.
46
 
The incongruity between theory and evidence is partially owing to 
the human aspect to labor, which makes wages resistant to market fluctu-
ation.
47
 “The human essence of labor also means that labor demand and 
supply curves are not independent functions, wages are likely to have a 
large degree of rigidity, and labor markets are no longer 
self-regulating.”
48
 Employers may be reluctant to lower wages because 
of the adverse effect on morale and productivity.
49
 Similarly, employers 
may hesitate to raise wages—or hire new workers—for fear of the con-
sequence, should they have to lower them again.
50
 Wages do not, and 
should not, fluctuate with the value of labor. “Persistent unemployment 
may therefore result, not due to minimum wage laws, unions or other 
                                                        
 39. See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 38, at 92. 
 40 . See, e.g., JOHN SCHMITT, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, WHY DOES THE 
MINIMUM WAGE HAVE NO DISCERNIBLE EFFECT ON EMPLOYMENT? (2013), available at 
http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/min-wage-2013-02.pdf (describing and appraising key 
minimum wage studies in the last fifteen years); David Card & Alan B. Krueger, Minimum Wages 
and Employment: A Case Study of the Fast Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4509, 1993), available at http://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w4509.pdf; see also Planet Money: Money, Work and TV, supra note 33. 
 41. See Planet Money: Money, Work and TV, supra note 33. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See id. 
 44. Id. at 14:15. 
 45. SCHMITT, supra note 40, at 1. Schmitt discusses a meta-study concluding that there are 
significant negative effects on employment, but dismisses the study as “considerably more subjec-
tive and arguably less relevant to the United States.” Id. at 6. 
 46. Id. at 4–5. Studies about minimum wage impacts often focus on teens and fast-food work-
ers. Id. at 5, 10. 
 47. See generally Kaufman, supra note 38. 
 48. Id. at 88. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See id. 
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such institutional impediments . . . but from the hard-wired though ana-
lytically inconvenient facts of human nature.”
51
 
Further explaining the results of minimum wage studies, where 
there is a minimum wage increase, there are so-called alternative “chan-
nels of adjustment” that can accommodate the increased cost of labor 
besides eliminating jobs.
52
 Because labor markets are not perfectly com-
petitive,
53
 employers have a number of options to maintain profitability.
54
 
In addition to raising prices or cutting expenses such as nonwage benefits, 
“a minimum-wage increase gives new incentives to employers to under-
take additional productivity-improving practices.”
55
 Furthermore, evi-
dence shows that higher paid workers are more productive and less likely 
to take advantage of their employers.
56
 The various secondary effects of 
raising wages,
57
 as well as strategies employers may adopt,
58
 reduce any 
impact on employment nearly to zero.
59
 Considering the evidence, and 
logical explanations backing up that evidence, citing the adverse effect 
on unemployment in the minimum wage debate is less than persuasive. 
B. Technological Innovation Gives Regulating Wages Even Greater   
Importance 
Advances in technology are almost guaranteed to impact the job 
market. Not only does technology threaten to eliminate low-skill or un-
skilled jobs,
60
 it drops the value of human labor.
61
 Technology increases 
the economic divide between skilled and unskilled laborers, and, im-
                                                        
 51. See id. 
 52. SCHMITT, supra note 40, at 10, 11. 
         53. See id. at 12; supra text accompanying notes 48–51. See generally Kaufman, supra note 38. 
 54. See SCHMITT, supra note 40. 
 55. Id. at 12. 
 56. The Gist, supra note 26 at 13:55. 
 57. SCHMITT, supra note 40, at 13. “Turnover has been one of the more troublesome problems 
to manage in the foodservice industry. In 2013, franchised establishments experienced a turnover 
rate of 93 percent.” Study: Raising Wages to $15 an Hour for Limited-Service Restaurant Employees 
Would Raise Prices 4.3 Percent, PURDUE UNIV. NEWS (July 27, 2015), 
https://www.purdue.edu/newsroom/releases/2015/Q3/study-raising-wages-to-15-an-hour-for-
limited-service-restaurant-employees-would-raise-prices-4.3-percent.html (quoting Richard Ghiselli, 
the coauthor of the study). 
 58. SCHMITT, supra note 41, at 12. 
 59. Id. at 12–13. 
 60. Derek Thompson, A World Without Work, ATLANTIC, Jul.–Aug. 2015, at 54 (citing a 2013 
prediction by Oxford researchers that “machines might be able to perform half of all U.S. jobs in the 
next two decades”). 
 61. Id. at 53 (predicting that “technology could exert a slow but continual downward pressure 
on the value and availability of work”). Some economists estimate that nearly half of the decline in 
paid wages in the United States can be attributed to technology replacing workers. Id. 
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portantly, between capital owners and laborers.
62
 “Even when technolog-
ical progress increases productivity and overall wealth, it can also affect 
the division of rewards, potentially making some people worse off than 
they were before the innovation.”
63
 In the event that a high minimum 
wage does adversely impact unemployment of unskilled (or teenage) 
workers,
64
 the jobs of these workers are still not safe; the increased use of 
technology will cause the value of unskilled labor to drop below the 
point where compensation for that labor is enough to sustain an individu-
al, let alone a family.
65
 
Viewed from a different angle, the use of technology can make it 
affordable for employers to pay their employees a living wage.
66
 Yet, 
outside pressures such as regulation or public opinion are probably nec-
essary to get employers to pay these higher wages. The combination of a 
higher minimum wage and the use of advanced technology could im-
prove working conditions, increase wages, and lead to more opportuni-
ties for fulfilling employment. 
C. Economic Rights, Human Rights, and the Right to a Living Wage 
In addition to more practical considerations, moral considerations 
must be incorporated into the analysis. In President Roosevelt’s 1944 
State of the Union Address he stated, “We cannot be content, no matter 
how high that general standard of living may be, if some fraction of our 
people—whether it be one-third or one-fifth or one-tenth—is ill-fed, ill-
clothed, ill-housed, and insecure.”
67
 He proposed a Second Bill of Rights, 
an economic bill of rights, and called for Congress to recognize and es-
tablish laws protecting “the right to a useful and remunerative job”; “the 
                                                        
 62 . ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, RACE AGAINST THE MACHINE: HOW THE 
DIGITAL REVOLUTION IS ACCELERATING INNOVATION, DRIVING PRODUCTIVITY, AND 
IRREVERSIBLY TRANSFORMING EMPLOYMENT AND THE ECONOMY 45, 47 (2011). 
 63. See id. at 39. 
 64. For a discussion of the changing demographics of minimum wage workers, see infra notes 
73–74 and accompanying text. 
 65. Thompson, supra note 60, at 53. 
 66. Lydia DePillis, Minimum-Wage Offensive Could Speed Arrival of Robot-Powered Restau-
rants, WASH. POST (Aug. 16, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/ 
minimum-wage-offensive-could-speed-arrival-of-robot-powered-restaurants/2015/08/16/35f284ea-
3f6f-11e5-8d45-d815146f81fa_story.html. 
 67. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Message to Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 11, 1944), 
available at http://www.heritage.org/initiatives/first-principles/primary-sources/fdrs-second-bill-of-
rights. 
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right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and recrea-
tion”; and the rights to a home, medical care, and a good education.
68
 
Even before the genesis of the federal minimum wage, social jus-
tice concerns motivated discussion of a “living wage.”
69
 Some of this 
debate is premised on the idea that individuals do not truly enter freely 
into contracts if they are driven by a need to secure the bare necessities.
70
 
A living wage is defined as “(1) a subsistence wage; [and] (2) a wage 
sufficient to provide the necessities and comforts essential to an accepta-
ble standard of living.”
71
 Consider that a minimum wage that is merely 
sufficient to allow workers to subsist does not address the concern of 
income inequality. Mere subsistence wages do not allow for upward mo-
bility or address the growing concern of income inequality in the United 
States. 
One consideration that is relevant to the ultimate conclusions of this 
Note is the changing demographics of minimum wage workers. The ar-
gument is often asserted that raising the minimum wage will disad-
vantage teenagers trying to get a first job.
72
 It may be true that employers 
would be unwilling to pay employees $15 per hour for their first job. But 
the belief that sixteen or seventeen year olds represent the vast majority 
of people in minimum wage positions is inaccurate.
73
 Primary breadwin-
ners, such as single parents, often hold minimum wage jobs.
74
 Consider-
ing whether the minimum wage provides sufficient income requires a 
look at a living wage calculation for a family. 
The objectives of minimum wage laws vary. As described above, 
the minimum wage has been historically linked to the consistent concern 
of unemployment.
75
 The Seattle Ordinance purportedly aims to address 
income inequality, remedy gender wage gaps, and meet the needs of 
low-wage workers as city living becomes increasingly expensive.
76
 No-
tably, the City of Seattle is concerned with remedying income inequali-
                                                        
 68. Id.; Stephanie Wagner, Note, Big Box Living Wage Ordinances: Upholding Our Constitu-
tive Commitment to a Remunerative Job, 15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 359, 359–60 (2008). 
 69. Thies, supra note 1, at 722. 
 70. Id. at 720. 
 71. Living Wage, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/living% 
20wage (last visited Apr. 15, 2015). 
 72. See, e.g., The Gist, supra note 26. 
 73. The inference being that if 52% of fast-food workers are on public assistance, they have 
families to support, or at least have no family supporting them. See KEN JACOBS ET AL., THE HIGH 
PUBLIC COST OF LOW WAGES (2015), available at http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/pdf/2015/the-
high-public-cost-of-low-wages.pdf. 
 74. The Gist, supra note 26, at 18:00. 
 75. See supra text accompanying notes 21–34. 
 76. Ordinance 124490, supra note 11. 
2016] Three Out of Four Economists Recommend 603 
ty.
77
 The Seattle Ordinance recognized that “President Barack Obama 
has called addressing income inequality . . . ‘the defining issue of our 
time’.”
78
 As a stated goal of the Ordinance, the minimum wage should 
aim to accommodate a living wage that is defined by quality of life, not 
mere subsistence, and provides the opportunity for upward mobility. 
D. Higher Wages Support the Economy and Relieve the Burden on Pub-
lic Assistance Programs 
Humanitarian reasons aside, there are additional practical justifica-
tions for raising wages. A higher minimum wage could support the econ-
omy and get people off public assistance programs. Where raising the 
minimum wage is typically measured to simply catch up with inflation, 
the Seattle Ordinance is designed to actually stimulate the economy.
79
 
Economist and former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich has argued for 
reducing income inequality by increasing worker pay, explaining that 
distributing money to the low-income sector of society does more to 
stimulate the economy than putting that money into the hands of the su-
per rich.
80
 The wealthy have no need to spend their millions and will 
simply invest in hedge funds so their vast wealth makes them even rich-
er.
81
 Conversely, out of necessity, low- and middle-class citizens buy and 
spend, rather than invest and save.
82
 Even when basic needs are covered, 
people at the lower end of the income spectrum will pay for things that 
are not necessities, but are key to upward mobility.
83
 Similarly, a subsist-
ence wage may not include provisions for the future or for unforeseen 
expenses, such as medical emergencies. Eventually, much of the low-
                                                        
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
         79. See Dana Milbank, Raising the Minimum Wage Without Raising Havoc, WASH. POST (Sept. 
5, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dana-milbank-no-calamity-yet-as-seatac-wash-
adjusts-to-15-minimum-wage/2014/09/05/d12ba922-3503-11e4-9e92-0899b306bbea_story.html 
(explaining that, despite fears that local businesses will suffer, proprietors continue to expand). Ex-
amples cited include Tom Douglas, owner of several Seattle restaurants, who has continued to an-
nounce plans to open new restaurants in Seattle. Id. 
 80. INEQUALITY FOR ALL supra note 36, at 17:00; SCHMITT, supra note 40, at 12. 
 81. INEQUALITY FOR ALL, supra note 36, at 17:00. 
 82. Id. (noting that “consumer spending is seventy percent of the United States economy”). 
Middle and lower class spending also helps explain the conflict between theory and data with regard 
to a minimum wage’s effect on employment discussed supra in Part I.A. “Human beings are not just 
a supply, they also create their own demand.” The Gist, supra note 26, at 13:06; see also 
INEQUALITY FOR ALL, supra note 36, at 18:50 (explaining that customers and workers, not the su-
per-rich, are job creators). 
 83. Education is one example of a commodity that appears to be treated as a luxury in the 
United States. 
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Thus, a further consideration of the minimum and living wage 
analysis is presented: the burden on taxpayers due to low-income sector 
reliance on governmental assistance. In fact, a recent study by the Berke-
ley Labor Center indicated that 52% of fast-food workers—many of 
whom are employed by fast-food franchises—rely on public assistance.
85
 
Public assistance programs such as Medicaid, Children’s Health Insur-
ance Program (CHIP), Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF), and 
the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)
86
 generally pro-
vide support to families, not single teenagers working their first jobs. 
Public assistance programs amount to no small cost to the govern-
ment. Between 2009 and 2011, the government—including federal and 
state contributions—paid $152.8 billion annually toward public assis-
tance programs.
87
 Over half of this assistance went to working families.
88
 
Particularly relevant to this Note is the McDonald’s franchise, whose U.S. 
workforce is over 700,000 and is estimated to cost taxpayers $1.2 billion 
per year.
89
 McDonald’s profits in 2012 were $5.46 billion.
90
 Through 
providing public assistance to the employees of franchises such as 
McDonald’s, the government and taxpayers are effectively subsidizing 
McDonald’s profits.
91
 In this regard, a higher minimum wage would shift 
                                                        
 84. Low-income earners may not be able to wait until old age or a medical emergency before 
requiring governmental assistance. The McDonald’s franchise was featured in the news after a min-
imum wage worker called the employee hotline (“McResources”) seeking to improve her situation 
and was referred to government assistance programs such as food stamps and Medicaid. Haley Pe-
terson, McDonald’s Hotline Caught Urging Employee to Get Food Stamps, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 24, 
2013, 4:00 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/mcdonalds-mcresources-hotline-tells-nancy-
salgado-to-get-on-food-stamps-2013-10. This circumstance highlights how the government subsidiz-
es businesses that pay at the minimum wage, further distorting the market. In other words, setting the 
minimum wage is not the only market distortion. Employers might have to pay higher than the min-
imum wage in a truly fair market, where governmental assistance programs were unavailable. 
 85. JACOBS ET AL., supra note 73, at 3. 
 86. Id. at 1–2. 
 87. Id. at 2. 
 88. Id. 
 89. NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, SUPER-SIZING PUBLIC COSTS: HOW LOW WAGES AT TOP 
FAST-FOOD CHAINS LEAVE TAXPAYERS FOOTING THE BILL 1–2 (2013), available at 
http://nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/NELP-Super-Sizing-Public-Costs-Fast-Food-Report.pdf. 
NELP estimated that the total cost to tax payers to provide assistance to employees of the top ten 
fast-food companies was $3.8 billion per year. Id. Employees of the Subway franchise receive $436 
million in public benefits. Id. 
 90. Id. at 3; see also Patricia Cohen, Working, but Needing Public Assistance Anyway, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 13, 2015, at B1, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/13/business/economy/working-but-
needing-public-assistance-anyway.html. 
 91. NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, supra note 89, at 3. Other major fast-food franchises include 
Subway and Dairy Queen. Id. 
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some of the burden of ensuring that franchise employees could live sus-
tainably from the shoulders of the government to those of the franchise 
itself. 
While the merits of the minimum wage continue to be debated,
92
 
the philosophies at the foundation for each school of thought inform 
opinions about what to do with the minimum wage. Those who support 
the minimum wage in general argue that it should reflect a living wage. 
Those who oppose minimum wage laws want to see the minimum wage 
stay low. The fact of the matter is that the minimum wage has been a part 
of our econo-employment system for more than three-quarters of a centu-
ry and is here to stay. So, the question becomes how to address the min-
imum wage when income inequality is becoming an increasingly trou-
bling problem. The following Part explains the Seattle Ordinance—one 
city’s approach to resolving the income inequality question with mini-
mum wage laws. 
II. SEATTLE’S GRAND EXPERIMENT: THE LAW AND THE CONTROVERSY 
Although there have been a variety of objections to Seattle’s mini-
mum wage increase, it is the implementation schedule that is at issue in 
the IFA lawsuit.
93
 This Part explains the particulars of the implementa-
tion schedule, the IFA’s allegations, and the City’s response. 
A. The Nitty-Gritty Details of Seattle’s Minimum Wage Ordinance 
Phase-In Schedule 
In enacting this ordinance, the City of Seattle acknowledged the 
concern that smaller employers will have difficulty meeting the new re-
quirements.
94
 For this reason, the Income Inequality Advisory Commit-
tee (IIAC)—the task force charged with the job of coming up with a plan 
to address income inequality—developed two implementation schedules: 
a three-year schedule for large employers (Schedule 1), and a seven-year 
schedule for small employers (Schedule 2).
95
 
Ultimately, all employers with workers in Seattle will be required 
to pay a $15 minimum wage.
96
 Large employers—those who employ 
                                                        
 92. See supra text accompanying notes 33–44. 
 93. IFA Complaint, supra note 31. 
 94. Ordinance 124490, supra note 11. The cost for some employers could be as much as 
$20,000 per year. 
 95 . CITY OF SEATTLE, INCOME INEQUALITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE (2014), available at 
http://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/IncomeInequalityAdvisoryCommittee/one-
pager.pdf. 
 96. SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 14.19.030 (2014). 
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more than 500 employees—are on Schedule 1 and have until January 1, 
2017 to implement the $15 minimum wage through incremental increas-
es.
97
 Small employers—those with 500 or fewer employees—are on 
Schedule 2 and have until January 1, 2021
98
 to increase their wages to 
$15 per hour.
99
 Once reaching $15 per hour, the minimum wage will be 
indexed to increase annually with inflation.
100
 
For purposes of determining whether an employer is Schedule 1 or 
Schedule 2, the number of employees is calculated based on the employ-
er’s total workforce, regardless of location.
101
 Therefore, if a business 
employs 501 people, but only one within the City of Seattle, that em-
ployer must pay that employee based on the Seattle minimum wage for 
the time they spend working within the geographic boundaries of the 
city.
102
 And, as was pointed out by the IFA in its complaint, “a non-
franchise business that has 500 employees is treated as a ‘small’ employ-
er whereas a small franchisee with only 5 employees is treated as a ‘large’ 
employer if, as is usually the case, the franchisee is part of a network that 
employs more than 500 workers.”
103
 
In evaluating whether this classification is justified, it is necessary 
to discuss the justifications for the different schedules. Small business 
owners fear being unable to keep up with paying the increased wages to 
their employees and thus being forced to close.
104
 The danger imposed on 
small businesses is more acute because, with generally lower profit mar-
gins, there is less flexibility to adjust wages.
105
 In turn, employees of 
                                                        
 97. Id. § 14.19.040. But employers who pay into an employee’s medical benefits plan have 
until 2018. 
 98. Id. § 14.19.050. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. § 14.19.030. Note that while the Seattle Ordinance provides for indexed increases once 
the $15 minimum is reached, and Washington State’s minimum wage has been increasing with infla-
tion since 2001, the federal minimum wage only increases by congressional action. Several states, 
but not all, already have annual indexed increases, and several more have indexed increases sched-
uled to start within the next few years. State Minimum Wages: 2015 Minimum Wage by State, NAT’L 
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/state-minimum-
wage-chart.aspx (last updated Nov. 10, 2015). 
 101. SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 14.19.010 (2014). 
 102. Id. § 14.19.020. 
 103. IFA Complaint, supra note 31, at 2. 
 104. Barreto, supra note 12; see also Andrew Friedman, Your Favorite Indie Shop is Out of 
Business if $15-an-Hour Happens, THE STRANGER (Apr. 2, 2014), 
http://www.thestranger.com/seattle/your-favorite-indie-shop-is-out-of-business-if-15-an-hour-
happens/Content?oid=19182099 (noting that payroll is a large portion of the cost of running a small 
business and appealing to the independent-business lover to oppose this law to keep local small 
businesses from closing); FORWARD SEATTLE, http://forwardseattle.wordpress.com (last visited Apr. 
15, 2015). 
 105. See Friedman, supra note 104. 
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small businesses fear losing their jobs over the Ordinance, instead prefer-
ring low-wage and steady employment to uncertain employment with 
higher pay.
106
 In response, proponents of the Ordinance argue that in-
creased wages will improve worker retention, productivity, and customer 
service.
107
 There are undoubtedly growing pains associated with this type 
of action. The extended seven-year phase-in period small businesses 
have to implement the new minimum wage is meant to allow for an easi-
er adjustment. Although franchisees are still bound by the shorter, three-
year schedule, they are still permitted an adjustment period. 
B. The IFA’s Position Regarding Franchises and the Ordinance 
One rapid, vehement response to the Seattle Ordinance was the IFA 
lawsuit.
108
 On June 11, 2014, merely nine days after the Seattle Ordi-
nance was passed, the IFA filed suit in U.S. District Court seeking pre-
liminary and permanent injunctive relief.
109
 The complaint alleged sever-
al violations, including violations of the federal and state constitutions as 
well as statutory law.
110
 One key allegation stated that the Seattle Ordi-
nance “unfairly and irrationally discriminates against interstate com-




The complaint argued that not only are franchises subject to uncon-
stitutional differential treatment, but they are also unfairly disadvantaged 
by the Seattle Ordinance.
112
 The IFA asserted that “[small franchisees] 
will be forced to raise prices, reduce employees, or lower the quality of 
their goods and services to comply with the Ordinance to a substantially 
greater extent than their non-franchise counterparts.”
113
 The IFA argued 
that the Seattle Ordinance is particularly discriminatory because, as a 
result of the disparity in minimum wage requirements between 2017 and 
2021, small franchises will be subject to an unfairly competitive market-
                                                        
 106. Barreto, supra note 12. Employees may criticize such a dramatic increase in minimum 
wage as unfairly increasing compensation for newly-hired employees while employees who have 
invested years working for a company may earn $15 or less. This particular objection is from the 
author’s own personal experience and conversation with former colleagues. 
 107. See generally City Minimum Wage Laws supra note 10; see also supra text accompanying 
note 56. 
 108. See, e.g., Bacon, supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 109. IFA Complaint, supra note 31, at 1, 33. 
 110. See generally id. at 23–33; Int’l Franchise Ass’n. Inc. v. City of Seattle, 97 F. Supp. 3d 
1256, 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2015). 
 111. IFA Complaint, supra note 31, at 2. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 3. 
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place.
114
 During those four years, Schedule 1 employers—including ap-
plicable franchisees—must pay their employees a $15 minimum wage, 
while Schedule 2 employers will still be incrementally increasing their 
wages. The IFA argued that the “perverse effect” of the Seattle Ordi-
nance’s classifications—specifically, that an employer with 495 employ-
ees will be on a less strict schedule than a franchisee with a handful of 




The IFA went so far as to claim that the higher minimum wage will 
destroy the franchise business model.
116
 The IFA explained in a letter to 
Seattle Mayor Ed Murray that “[a]ccording to case law as well as state 
and federal statutes, franchisees are not the employees of franchisors. 
Likewise, franchisees’ employees are not the employees of franchi-
sors.”
117
 Rather, the letter asserts, “[i]t is the owner of an individual local 
franchise who is responsible for the hiring and wage decisions at his or 
her location.”
118
 The Seattle Ordinance ignores this characteristic of fran-
chisees, not franchisors, as employers. 
The complaint carefully characterizes the plaintiffs as individuals 
putting it all on the line to embark on a business venture. In addition to 
the IFA, there are a number of franchisees located in Seattle that are 
plaintiffs in this case.
119
 The franchisors are not actual parties to the law-
suit.
120
 The complaint highlighted the substantial personal investment on 
the part of the plaintiffs.
121
 Moreover, these franchises are strategically 
characterized as providing more specialized services than entry-level 
positions at McDonalds.
122
 Appealing to America’s fixation on entrepre-
neurship and extolling the franchise model as creating opportunity for 
aspiring business owners evokes sympathy for the plaintiffs. 
                                                        
 114. Id. 
 115. Letter from Dean Heyl, Vice President, State Government Relations, Public Policy & Tax 
Counsel, International Franchise Association, to Ed Murray, Seattle City Mayor, and Members of 
the Seattle City Council (May 19, 2014), available at http://emarket.franchise.org/SeattleMinimum 
WageLetter.pdf [hereinafter Heyl Letter]; see also IFA Complaint, supra note 31, at 12. 
 116. Heyl Letter, supra note 115. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. IFA Complaint, supra note 31, at 4–6. 
 120. See id. The franchisee-plaintiffs are Brightstar Care (homecare for children and elderly) 
and Alphaprint, Inc., of the AlphaGraphics franchise. Id. at 5. 
 121. Id. at 18. Charles Stempler, owner of Alphaprint, supposedly invested $100,000 while the 
Lyons, owners and operators of Brightstar, purportedly invested more than $435,000, over half of 
which was borrowed. Id. at 19. 
 122. Id. at 5–6. 
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C. City of Seattle’s Position Regarding Franchises and the Ordinance 
The City of Seattle’s response to the IFA’s arguments shows very 
little concern for the alleged hardship franchisees will face, instead paint-
ing a different picture of the franchise model. Mayor Murray responded 
to the IFA’s statements, pointing out that “[f]ranchises have resources 
that . . . small business[es] . . . do not have.”
123
 The Mayor stated that, in 
determining classifications for Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 employers, the 
City considered the differences between a truly local business and a fran-
chise: “Franchise restaurants have menus that are developed by a corpo-
rate national entity, a food supply and products that are provided by a 
corporate national entity, training provided by a corporate national entity, 
and advertising provided by a corporate national entity.”
124
 These addi-
tional support structures were deemed sufficient to offset any hardship 
caused by attaching franchises to the shorter, three-year schedule. 
Significantly, franchises were deliberately considered in the City’s 
analysis and plan: “The movement around wage equality in our nation 
began with fast food workers walking off the job. . . . That was the straw 
that broke wage disparity’s back in this nation.”
125
 The IIAC apparently 
found the interests of franchisees less compelling than the interests of 
low-wage workers in the city. After all, the Seattle Ordinance expressly 
includes franchises in the definition of “Schedule 1 Employer.”
126
 
Furthermore, the Mayor went so far as to say that the franchise 
business model is flawed, suggesting that franchisees should look to their 
corporate parents for support, not to the City.
127
 The Mayor’s statements 
subliminally evoke concern that any benefit to franchises derived from a 
low minimum wage is paid for by low-wage workers, the government, 
and even the middle class through taxation.
128
 
                                                        
 123. Seattle Mayor Ed Murray, Statement on International Franchise Association Lawsuit 
(June 11, 2014), available at http://murray.seattle.gov/mayor-murray-statement-on-international-
franchise-association-lawsuit/#sthash.OzAheAX1.dpbs [hereinafter Mayor Murray Statement]. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id.; see also Answer at 5, Int’l Franchise Ass’n. v. City of Seattle, 97 F. Supp. 3d 1256 
(W.D. Wash. 2015) [hereinafter Seattle Answer]. 
 126. SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 14.19.030 (2014). 
 127. Mayor Murray Statement, supra note 123. “There is a problem in the franchise business 
model and I believe this is a discussion franchise owners should be having with their corporate par-
ents. I don’t believe that the economic strain comes from a fairly slow phase in of a higher minimum 
wage, but on a business model that really does—in many cases—harm franchise owners. I don’t 
doubt at all that franchise workers are operating under tight conditions, but I think it’s a conversation 
to have with the people who have decided to spend oodles of money on lawyers to fight a higher 
minimum wage.” Id. 
 128. See supra notes 84–91 and accompanying text. 
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Famously, McDonald’s Corporation is consistently used as an ex-
ample of a franchise: a massive corporation, whose executive made $9.5 
million in 2014.
129
 The IFA prudently chose plaintiffs that defy the 
McDonald’s stereotype.
130
 While it is clear that franchises vary in size 
and, to some degree, method of operation, the question remains whether 
the City of Seattle has unjustly designated McDonald’s Corporation (and 
its ilk) as representative of the franchise business model. 
D. The Courts’ Conclusions Regarding Franchises and the Ordinance 
The IFA’s motion for a preliminary injunction was filed on August 
5, 2014.
131
 In March 2015, the District Court for the Western District of 
Washington denied the IFA’s motion,
132
 and on September 25, 2015, the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied the IFA’s appeal.
133
 The 
basis for the IFA’s motion and the courts’ decisions focused on the City 
of Seattle’s alleged constitutional violations, which are not addressed in 
this Note.
134
 The opinions from both the district court and the court of 
appeals also note the impact that a preliminary injunction would have on 
the City’s workers.
135
 Although the court of appeals concluded that “[t]he 
district court . . . erred in finding that IFA did not demonstrate that the 
balance of hardships tips in its favor,” the court found that “the district 
court did not err in concluding that the public interest disfavors an in-
junction.”
136
 The Ninth Circuit’s observation is interesting because in 
balancing hardships, the court compared hardships of the IFA and the 
City as entities. In contrast, when considering the public interest impact, 
the court considered the hardship of Seattle workers, finding that 




                                                        
 129 . Editorial: Redefine Franchises Under Seattle’s Minimum-Wage Proposal, SEATTLE 
TIMES (June 2, 2014, 11:56 AM), http://seattletimes.com/html/editorials/2023733816_editminimum 
wage31xml.html. 
 130. See supra text accompanying notes 119–122. 
 131. Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Limited Preliminary Injunction, Int’l Franchise Ass’n. Inc. v. City 
of Seattle, 97 F. Supp. 3d 1256 (W.D. Wash. 2015). 
 132. See id.; Int’l Franchise Ass’n, Inc, v. City of Seattle, 97 F. Supp. 3d 1256 (W.D. Wash. 
2015). 
 133. Int’l Franchise Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 803 F.3d 389 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 134. See Record of Oral Arguments, Int’l Franchise Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 803 F.3d 389 
(9th Cir. 2015), available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_video.php?pk_vid=000000 
8141. 
 135. Int’l Franchise Ass’n, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 1286; Int’l Franchise Ass’n, 803 F.3d at 412. 
 136. Int’l Franchise Ass’n, 803 F.3d at 412 (emphasis added). 
 137. Id. 
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The court of appeals also concluded that the IFA did provide evi-
dence that the Seattle Ordinance put them at a competitive disad-
vantage.
138
 It was enough for the IFA to provide evidence that “fran-
chisees will face higher minimum wage obligation compared to non-
franchisees.” Nevertheless, the court concluded that the IFA failed to 
provide evidence to show they would suffer irreparable harm.
139
 The fol-
lowing Parts examine the franchise business model
140
 and evaluate the 
impacts of the minimum wage schedule on corporate franchise entities, 




Franchises represent a significant sector of American business. The 
2007 Economic Census reported that franchised businesses employed 7.9 
million workers—5% of the total workforce—at 453,326 establish-
ments.
142
 The total annual sales of these businesses amounted to nearly 
$1.3 trillion and annual payroll was around $154 billion.
143
 The majority 




A. What are Franchises? 
The franchisor–franchisee relationship is typically governed by the 
franchise agreement, but federal, state, and local laws do impose certain 
regulations upon franchises.
145
 As defined by the Seattle Ordinance, a 
                                                        
 138. Id. at 411. 
 139. Id. The court noted: 
The record does not discuss the costs and revenues of these businesses, the performance 
of non-franchisees, current or future labor costs, the proportion of employees earning 
more than the minimum, or the elasticity of demand for goods and services provided by 
franchisees. Thus, it is impossible to evaluate whether franchisees will need to raise pric-
es or whether price changes will result in decreased demand. The chain of events sug-
gested by IFA is speculation that does not rise beyond the mere “possibility” of harm. 
Id. at 411–12. 
 140. See infra Part III. 
 141. See infra Part IV. 
 142. Ying Fan et al., Financial Constraints and Moral Hazard: The Case of Franchising 
(CESIFO, Working Paper No. 4474, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2359409. 
 143. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2007 ECONOMIC CENSUS: FRANCHISE STATISTICS (2007), availa-
ble at http://www.census.gov/econ/census/pdf/franchise_flyer.pdf. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Franchise Agreement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 773 (10th ed. 2014). “The contract 
between a franchisor and franchisee establishing the terms and conditions of the franchise relation-
ship. State and federal laws regulate franchise agreements.” Id. The Federal Trade Commission 
regulates some franchise activity, see 16 C.F.R. pt. 436 (2015), but franchise agreements are typical-
ly governed by state law and vary greatly from state to state. Washington is one of seventeen states 
that have adopted franchise relationship laws. Thomas M. Pitegoff, Franchise Relationship Laws: A 
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franchise has three elements: (1) “[a] person is granted the right to en-
gage in [a] business . . . under a marketing plan prescribed or suggested 
in substantial part by the grantor or its affiliate”; (2) “[t]he operation of 
the business is substantially associated with a trademark . . . owned by . . . 
the grantor or its affiliate”; and (3) the franchisee pays a fee for use of 
the trademark.
146
 In other words, trademark owners license the use of 
their trademarks to others, who get the benefit of the trademark’s reputa-
tion and goodwill associated with that trade name.
147
 The owner of the 
trademark maintains quality control over the goods and services provid-
ed.
148
 In return, the franchisee—those who are granted license to use the 




Scholars have identified a number of benefits and drawbacks to 
structuring a business as a franchise. In choosing to franchise, a business 
owner is able to see significant returns on investment with relatively low 
risk because the franchisees take on the risk of losing an investment 
when a new business is unsuccessful.
150
 The structure also incentivizes 
franchise owners, more than salaried or hourly employees, to work hard 
and make the business successful.
151
 In this way the franchise model has 
been thought to diminish the risks of adverse selection
152
 and moral haz-
ard.
153
 The drawbacks to franchising, however, require the franchisor to 
                                                                                                                            
Minefield for Franchisors, in BUILDING FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIPS: A GUIDE TO ANTICIPATING 
PROBLEMS, RESOLVING CONFLICTS, AND REPRESENTING CLIENTS 140, 142 (Ann Hurwitz & Ro-
chelle Buchsbaum Spandorf eds., 1996). A franchise agreement generally includes more than just a 
license to use the trademark; the franchisee also has the right to use the marketing and distribution 
system established by the franchisor. FUNDAMENTALS OF FRANCHISING 4 (Rupert M. Barkoff & 
Andres C. Selden eds., 2d ed. 2004). For example, in Washington the definitional requirements of a 
franchise include trademark license, marketing plan, fee, and part of disclosure law. Pitegoff, supra 
at 171–72. These elements also limit the scope in Washington of what is defined as a franchise in the 
state. Id. at 144. 
 146. SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 14.19.010 (2014). 
 147. FUNDAMENTALS OF FRANCHISING, supra note 145. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Scott Shane, The Pros and Cons of Franchising Your Business, ENTREPRENEUR (May 7, 
2013), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/226489. 
 151. Id. 
 152. CASES AND MATERIALS ON BUSINESS ENTITIES 883 (Eric A. Chiappinelli ed., 3d ed. 
2014) (defining the term as “[p]rincipals choosing suboptimal agents, or agents choosing suboptimal 
principals”). 
 153. Id. at 890 (defining the term as “[t]he risk that a party with discretion to act will choose an 
action that decreases the expected value of the transaction to the other party in a way that the other 
party cannot effectively prohibit”); see also Scott A. Shane, Making New Franchise Systems Work, 
19 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 697, 697 (1998). 
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relinquish some control.
154
 In addition, the nature of a structure that of-
fers greater incentives for each individual franchise to be successful can 
also put individual franchisees in competition with one another.
155
 
B. The Significance to the Franchisor-Franchisee Relationship 
While franchises might appear to offer opportunities to people who 
might not otherwise be able to afford the expensive and risky venture of 
business ownership, the opportunities are not expansively available so as 
to mitigate income inequality. Franchise ownership is still too expensive 
to be a viable option for the lower class. McDonald’s, for example, re-
quires a significant amount of independent capital from a prospective 
franchisee in order to even be considered for a franchise agreement:
156
 
“Generally, [McDonald’s] require[s] a minimum of $750,000 of non-
borrowed personal resources . . . .”
157
 McDonald’s also requires a buyer 
to pay a 25% cash down payment toward the purchase of an existing res-
taurant, or 40% for a brand new restaurant.
158
 In the case of McDonald’s 
franchisees, while the franchise structure may help a prospective busi-




The franchises that are party to the lawsuit show significant differ-
ences in size in comparison to McDonald’s—the go-to example of a 
franchise in this debate; yet, they are not as different as one might think. 
The plaintiffs invested a substantial amount of independent capital in 
starting their franchise locations in addition to having borrowed substan-
tial sums of money to start their businesses.
160
 Although the support pro-
vided through the franchise model may facilitate business ownership in 
some circumstances, the significant sum of money required to purchase a 
                                                        
 154. Shane, supra, note 150. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Acquiring a Franchise, ABOUT MCDONALD’S, http://www.aboutmcdonalds.com/mcd/ 
franchising/us_franchising/acquiring_a_franchise.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. “[T]he substantial financial resources required to open a fast-food franchise make entre-
preneurship an unrealistic option for front-line fast food workers earning poverty-level wages.” 
NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, GOING NOWHERE FAST: LIMITED OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY IN THE 
FAST FOOD INDUSTRY (July 2013), available at http://nelp.3cdn.net/84a67b124db45841d4_o0m6 
bq42h.pdf [hereinafter NELP OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY]. Professor Shane argues that when fran-
chisees are required to make greater investments in purchasing a franchise, the businesses are more 
likely to be successful because of self-selection in prospective franchisees. Shane, supra note 153, at 
598–99. If Professor Shane’s hypothesis is correct, franchisors have more incentive to increase the 
start-up cost, further prohibiting low-income entrepreneurs from becoming franchise owners. 
 160. IFA Complaint, supra note 31, at 14; see also supra note 121. 
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franchise means that those who suffer from the effects of income ine-
quality are still unlikely to be in the position to benefit from this oppor-
tunity. The business opportunities offered by the franchise model do not 
remedy income inequality. In fact, the same incentives that drive fran-
chisees to run a successful business may also incentivize paying low-as-
possible wages in order to maximize the franchise’s profits. The next 
Part discusses the minimum wage in connection with franchises. 
IV. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE AND A 
CRITIQUE OF ARGUMENTS 
As mentioned above, Seattle’s Ordinance is an experimental meas-
ure, intending to address a pervasive, troubling problem.
161
 Seattle plans 
to closely monitor and study the effects of the Ordinance’s implementa-
tion over the next few years.
162
 While only time will tell the true effects 
of the minimum wage, some predictions warrant analysis. 
A. The Effect of the Minimum Wage on Franchises, Franchise Owners, 
and Franchise Employees 
In supporting their position, opponents of raising the minimum 
wage appeal to the fear that the high minimum wage will have a devas-
tating effect on businesses,
163
 but again, evidence shows otherwise.
164
 
For example, a recent study predicts that raising the minimum wage to 
$15 per hour would only cause a 4.3% increase in prices at fast-food res-
taurants.
165
 In addition, despite the plaintiffs’ claim that franchises will 
be deterred from opening businesses in Seattle—and other areas where a 
high minimum wage imposes extra costs of operation
166
—at least some 
                                                        
 161. See infra p. 617. “Seattle’s greatest social and economic experiment is about to begin.” 
Bacon, supra note 14. 
 162. Faculty from the University of Washington’s Schools of Public Affairs, Public Health and 
Social Work will embark on a five-year study regarding the effect of the minimum wage increase. 
The study will examine several impacts, including the impact on workers, the community, employ-
ment, consumer prices, quality of life, eligibility for public assistance programs, and nonprofit ser-
vices. Peter Kelley, UW Faculty Team for Five-Year Study of Seattle’s Minimum Wage Increase, 
UW TODAY (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.washington.edu/news/2015/03/30/uw-faculty-team-for-
five-year-study-of-seattles-minimum-wage-increase/. 
 163. The IFA, for example, alleges the harm to franchise businesses in its complaint, which the 
district court found unsupported by facts. Int’l Franchise Ass’n, Inc, v. City of Seattle, 97 F. Supp. 
3d 1256, 1286 (W.D. Wash. 2015). 
 164. See, e.g., Roberto A. Ferdman, What Paying Fast Food Workers a Living Wage Would Do 
to the Price of a Big Mac, WASH. POST (July 30, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
wonkblog/wp/2015/07/30/what-doubling-the-minimum-wage-would-do-to-the-price-of-a-big-mac/. 
 165. Id. 
 166. IFA Complaint, supra note 31, at 2–3. 
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Significantly, the franchise structure also impacts the relationship 
between employee and employer, thus influencing how much external 
regulation may be required. The nature of franchise employees’ position 
limits their bargaining power.
168
 Employees of franchisees who have 
adopted the franchise structure are impeded from successfully protesting 
their low-wages because of the fragmented nature of this business mod-
el.
169
 What franchise employees’ protests can accomplish, however, is 
raising awareness of “the abysmal incomes of millions of hardworking 
Americans.”
170
 Where corporations have not always been adequately re-
sponsive, some city and state governments have taken action, raising the 
minimum wage.
171
 As labor unions decline,
172
 governments are stepping 
in to fill the role of protecting workers. 
The origins of the minimum wage are associated with an effort to 
provide a disadvantaged class of people with equal pay.
173
 That tradition 
of protecting disadvantaged workers continues today with the Seattle 
Ordinance.
174
 For better or for worse,
175
 our society has decided that an 
enforceable minimum wage is one means of continuing to protect the 
interests of disadvantaged workers. With various factors to consider, 
from unemployment to quality of life to reliance on public assistance, no 
one can accurately predict the effects of this “extreme” increase in the 
minimum wage. What most can agree on is that income inequality is a 
                                                        
 167. The Togo’s sandwich chain planned to open eighteen stores in the Seattle–Tacoma area in 
early 2015, despite the ordinance. Togo’s CEO says that franchisees, along with everyone else, will 
simply have to figure out ways to stay competitive, whether that means increasing prices, or finding 
other ways to save money. Rachel Lerman, Fast-Food Eatery Togo’s Will Expand to Seattle (Not 
Afraid of $15 Wage), PUGET SOUND BUS. J. (June 11, 2014, 2:54 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/ 
seattle/blog/2014/06/fast-food-eatery-togo-s-will-expand-to-seattle-not.html?page=all. 
 168. “The hundreds of thousands of people who work for the [McDonald’s] Company and its 
franchises are scattered among thousands of small outlets. It’s hard to see how even a rising number 
of sporadic strikes by discrete groups of employees will bring McDonald’s to the bargaining table 
anytime soon.” Harold Meyerson, How to Get a Raise at McDonald’s, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/harold-meyerson-minimum-wage-fights-mark-unions-
adapting-to-change/2014/09/03/8f1eb71c-3397-11e4-9e92-0899b306bbea_story.html. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. For details regarding the history of labor unions, an explanation of their decline, and an 
analysis of their potential force in the future, see Abraham L. Gitlow, Ebb and Flow in America’s 
Trade Unions: The Present Prospect, 63 LAB. L.J. 123 (2012). 
 173. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 174. Ordinance 124490, supra note 11, at 1–2. 
 175. For a discussion of the merits of minimum wage, see supra Part I. 
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troubling problem in this country.
176
 Because income inequality is such 
an important concern, even legitimate interests in opposition to this Or-
dinance should not prevent the City of Seattle and other local govern-
ments from trying different solutions. 
It is untenable to think that an employee would be prohibited from 
quitting his or her position because of the losses to the employer.
177
 It 
should be similarly distasteful to allow an employer to influence legisla-
tion intending to benefit employees. This point is exactly what the IFA is 
arguing: franchises will suffer economic harm as a result of the Seattle 
Ordinance. But one of the City’s goals in enacting the Ordinance is to 
improve the standard of living for Seattle workers.
178
 The lawsuit is es-
sentially claiming that franchise-businesses’ property rights should ex-
tend to controlling the wages of their employees, impinging on workers’ 
human rights. Although franchise employees are not compelled to enter 
into an employment contract with franchise owners, the lack of real 
choice and bargaining power in seeking employment puts employers at a 
significant advantage in setting wages. The power of labor unions has 
been declining
179
—and will likely continue to do so—thus, the govern-
ment is stepping in to protect and benefit workers.
180
 
B. Franchisors Have an Incentive to Help Franchisees Succeed 
Corporate franchises are not altruistic institutions; they have incen-
tives to ensure franchisees survive. Franchisors profit from opening new 
franchise locations.
181
 To return to the ubiquitous example of the 
McDonald’s franchise,
182
 McDonald’s receives a percentage of its fran-
chisees’ monthly sales.
183
 Thus, franchisors have an interest in seeing 
that their franchisees continue to be profitable. While individual fran-
chise owners may bear the initial burden of the Schedule 1 wage hike, 
the franchisor corporations will be adversely impacted by franchisee 
failures. Because the franchisor has an interest in the franchisee’s success, 
the argument that franchisees are unfairly disadvantaged is flawed—
                                                        
 176. But see Intelligence Squared U.S. Debates: Does Income Inequality Impair the American 
Dream?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 29, 2014, 1:32 PM), http://www.npr.org/player/v2/media 
Player.html?action=1&t=1&islist=false&id=359363643&m=359841625. 
 177. Witte, supra note 38, at 139. 
 178. Ordinance 124490, supra note 11, § 1. 
 179. See, e.g., Gitlow, supra note 172. 
 180. Kaufman, supra note 38. 
 181. FUNDAMENTALS OF FRANCHISING, supra note 145. 
 182. Acquiring a Franchise, supra note 156. 
 183. Id. This percentage includes a service fee of 4% of the monthly sales and “rent,” which 
could include a monthly base rent or an additional percentage of monthly sales. Id. 
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franchisors will not allow their franchisees to fail unless they become 
unprofitable. Franchises are therefore more similar to big businesses than 
small businesses and the Seattle Ordinance rightly classified them as 
Schedule 1 employers. 
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the consequences of the Seattle Ordinance are uncertain. 
Nevertheless, theory and research can offer rather persuasive evidence 
that the outlook is not as dire as some—such as the IFA—would have 
policymakers and the public believe. Even if this were not the case, theo-
retical harms should not deter Seattle and other jurisdictions from seek-
ing solutions to what is one of the defining social concerns of our time. 
In the words of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, “We have come to a 
clear realization of the fact that true individual freedom cannot exist 
without economic security and independence. ‘Necessitous men are not 
free men.’”
184
 It is the protection of our freedom that makes economic 
justice such a pressing concern. Franchise employees are some of the 
most vulnerable workers because they lack bargaining power and be-
cause many make minimum wage. Catering to the wishes of franchises 
would undercut the force of Seattle’s efforts. The courts have thus far 
denied the IFA’s motion, notably considering the impact to Seattle work-
ers.
185
 Other courts and local governments should follow this example 
and continue to put the interests of the low-income population in Ameri-
ca above the interests of corporate franchises. 
Although not thoroughly addressed in this Note, considering the fu-
ture of the minimum wage is connected to the future availability of low-
wage jobs. It has been predicted that in as little as a generation or two 
robotics and other technological advancements will take over most low-
wage positions, eventually making unskilled labor redundant and unnec-
essary.
186
 It is the opinion of this author that raising the minimum wage, 
while a valiant effort, will not resolve income inequality satisfactorily. 
Ultimately, to avoid mass unemployment, it will be necessary to invest in 
education and skilled job-training, thus avoiding the dangers of putting 
too high a price on unskilled labor (distorting the market) and the future 
problem of technology displacing huge portions of the labor force. 
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